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VARSITY BRANDS, INC. v. STAR ATHLETICA, LLC

“[C]opyright law reform is slow, broad-based, and premised on a one-size-fits-all
approach . . . .”1 Such an approach is problematic to copyright law because it disrupts a
court’s ability to focus on specific characteristics of individual works. It fails to consider
the presence or absence of the particular traits that ultimately determine a work’s
copyrightability.2
Broad, court-created tests used to determine the copyrightability of twodimensional pictorial, graphic, or sculptural (PGS) works do not apply equally to all
works found within an artistic category. Creating tests of this nature3 can lead to
inconsistent copyright protection for two-dimensional PGS works,4 and functionally
limit the scope of protection because categorizing original works into generic groups
overlooks the very traits that may render a work copyrightable. This approach to
copyrightability contradicts the purpose of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”),
which is to afford consistent protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.”5 While it is easier to create broad, vague tests than
narrowly tailored ones,6 the detriment of broadness and vagueness to furthering the
Act’s purpose should impel more individualized inquiries.
In Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, a case involving PGS works, the
plaintiff sued the defendant for copyright infringement when the defendant sold
merchandise incorporating designs that were substantially similar to those found on
the plaintiff ’s products.7 The Sixth Circuit held that the fabric designs on the
plaintiff ’s cheerleading uniforms were copyrightable because they were conceptually

1.

Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Stewarding the Common Law of Copyright, 60 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A.
103, 104 (2013).

2.

“Copyrightability” is a term of art that is derived from the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
A work is copyrightable, and is thus protected under the Act, when it is both original and fixed in a
tangible medium of expression. Id.

3.

Infra pp. 244–46.

4.

Compare Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the plaintiff ’s animal mannequins were copyrightable because their utilitarian purpose
was conceptually separable from the sculptural features, which ref lected the plaintiff ’s artistic
judgment), and Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
the appellant’s belt buckles were conceptually separable from their utilitarian function and therefore
copyrightable), with Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987)
(determining that a bicycle rack was not copyrightable because the aesthetic elements were not
conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements), and Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp.,
773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that mannequins of partial human torsos were not conceptually
separable from their utilitarian function, and therefore not copyrightable).

5.

17 U.S.C. § 102(a).

6.

See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 487 (6th Cir. 2015) (“These cases . . .
illustrate that it is difficult to select one approach to the question whether an artistic design is conceptually
separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article. We adopt a similar hybrid approach now.”).

7.

Id. at 470–75.
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separable8 from the intrinsic utilitarian function9 of the uniforms.10 The court created
and applied a hybrid approach that combined various conceptual separability tests
utilized by other circuits and scholars.11
This case comment contends that although the Sixth Circuit reached the proper
conclusion, it erred when it created and applied a hybrid conceptual separability test.
The subjective nature12 of the hybrid test13 makes it an inferior approach to determine
conceptual separability; several other straightforward, objective tests were already in
use in the courts.14 The court should have adopted the primary-subsidiary test set
8.

“Conceptual separability” is a term of art derived from the definition of PGS works in the Act that
refers to a PGS work’s separate and distinct identity. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. “Conceptual separability
means that a feature of the useful article is clearly recognizable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work, notwithstanding the fact that it cannot be physically separated from the article by ordinary
means.” Varsity, 799 F.3d at 483 (quoting U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright
Office Practices § 924.2(B) (3d ed. 2014)). Courts focus extensively on this analysis because if the
design of an article is not separable from its utilitarian function, the design is not copyrightable under
the Act. See Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005); Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v.
Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004); Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d 411; Jovani Fashion, Ltd.
v. Cinderella Divine, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

9.

The Act does not define the term “utilitarian function.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. However, it defines “useful
article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance
of the article or to convey information.” Id. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the term
“utilitarian” means “made to be useful rather than to be decorative or comfortable.” Utilitarian, MerriamWebster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/utilitarian (last visited Feb. 6, 2017). What
constitutes an object’s “utilitarian function” is fact specific and depends on the object’s basic function. For
example, the Fourth Circuit stated in Superior Form Builders:
The objective in designing a chair is to create a utilitarian object, albeit an aesthetically
pleasing one; the objective in creating a statue of a dancer is to express the idea of a
dancer. As the Act makes the distinction, a useful article has as its function something
more than portraying its own appearance.

74 F.3d at 493.
10.

Varsity, 799 F.3d at 492.

11.

Id. at 487–89; see infra note 41 and text accompanying notes 41–47.

12.

Hybrid tests are subjective in nature because they comprise multiple tests. See infra note 13; see also James
G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 Ariz. St. L.J.
773, 801 n.128 (1995) (“The Court must engage in a meta-subjective balancing test to determine which
factors, objective and subjective, to include in its final formulation of doctrine.”). Courts are left to
determine which individual tests within a hybrid bear more weight in any individual case; this requires a
degree of subjective judgment. See infra pp. 252–53, for a discussion about the policy implications of the
Varsity court’s decision to utilize a hybrid approach to conceptual separability.

13.

Hybrid tests are different from balancing tests. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “balancing test” as “[a]
doctrine whereby an adjudicator measures competing interests and decides which interest should
prevail.” Balancing Test, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Hybrid tests are a combination of
multiple theories or preexisting tests. Wilson, supra note 12, at 773. Each preexisting test has different
factors that contribute to the legal analysis. Balancing tests are individual tests with different components
that factor into a legal analysis. See generally id. (discussing different tests utilized by courts). Any factor
may be given more weight in a given case but all factors are part of the same test. Id. at 805 & n.148.

14.

For a list and explanation of the nine objective tests that existed at the time of the Sixth Circuit’s
decision, see infra note 41.
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forth by the Second Circuit in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,15 limiting
the test’s application to garment designs. Had the court done so, it also would have
avoided issues pertaining to the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle16 because the
primary-subsidiary test focuses on the relationship between a work’s artistic features
and its utilitarian function.17 The Sixth Circuit’s new hybrid test establishes confusing
precedent that will yield inconsistent results and create unnecessary complexity in
the conceptual separability arena.18
Varsity Brands, Inc. (“Varsity”) is a Tennessee-based company that designs and
manufactures cheerleading uniforms.19 Varsity’s designers sketch “original combinations,
positionings, and arrangements of elements which include V’s (chevrons), lines, curves,
stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted V’s, coloring, and shapes.”20 Varsity uses one of four
methods to transfer the designs onto the fabric: “‘cutting and sewing panels of fabric
and braid together’; sublimation; embroidery; or screen printing.”21 After manufacturing
is complete, Varsity sells its merchandise online and in catalogs. 22 Varsity holds
copyrights for many of its two-dimensional designs, including those at issue in the
instant case.23
Star Athletica, LLC (“Star”) also markets and sells sports uniforms and athletic
apparel for cheerleading, basketball, football, lacrosse, and baseball, 24 and utilizes
similar marketing techniques. 25 After seeing the advertisements of Star’s 2010
designs, Varsity sued in the Western District of Tennessee alleging copyright
infringement against Star under the Act. 26 Varsity claimed that Star sold, distributed,
15.

632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).

16.

For an explanation of this principle, see infra note 92. See also Donald S. Chisum et al.,
Understanding Intellectual Property Law § 4C[1][d] (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the aesthetic
nondiscrimination principle).

17.

Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993–94.

18.

Robert Kirk Walker & Ben Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in Copyright Law: A Community
of Practice Standard, 109 Nw. U. L. Rev. 343, 367 (2015) (“[C]ourts face a difficult challenge determining
conceptual separability. But by randomly switching between major aesthetic theories that are
theoretically incompatible, courts make this challenge even more difficult for themselves, and as a
consequence, the case law fails to provide artists with guidance as to the scope of protection available to
such works.”).

19.

Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 471, 494 (6th Cir. 2015).

20. Id. at 471 (citation omitted).
21.

Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). “Sublimation involves printing the design on a piece of paper.
The paper is then fed through a machine that heats the ink on the paper into a gas which is infused into
the fabric by pressing the paper and fabric together.” Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No.
10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2014), vacated, 799 F.3d 468.

22.

Varsity, 799 F.3d at 471.

23.

Id.

24.

Id. at 474.

25.

Varsity, 2014 WL 819422, at *2.

26. Varsity, 799 F.3d at 474–75.
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and advertised cheerleading uniforms that copied and were substantially similar to
five of its copyrighted designs.27
In the district court, Star argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on all
of Varsity’s claims, arguing that Varsity’s copyrights were invalid because “(1) Varsity’s
designs are for useful articles, which are not copyrightable; and (2) the pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural elements of Varsity’s designs were not physically or conceptually
separable from the uniforms, making [them] ineligible for copyright protection.”28
Varsity argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because its designs were
nonfunctional and conceptually separable from the uniforms and therefore Star’s
conduct constituted copyright infringement.29
Relying on the language of the Act, the district court granted Star’s motion for
summary judgment.30 The Act provides:
[Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works] include works of artistic craftsmanship
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned; the design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article.31

The Act further defines a “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information.” 32 The district court determined that the utilitarian function of a
cheerleading uniform is to identify oneself as a cheerleader, and the colors, shapes,
stripes, and similar designs make the apparel recognizable as a cheerleading
uniform.33 Therefore, the designs were fundamental to the clothing as a cheerleading
uniform. 34 The district court found that Varsity’s designs were not physically or
conceptually separable from the uniform because they merged with the functional
aspects of the uniform and evoked the concept of cheerleading in the viewer’s mind.35
Thus, the court found that the designs were not copyrightable.36 Varsity appealed.37
27.

Id.

28. Id. at 475.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).

32.

Id.

33.

Varsity, 799 F.3d at 475.

34. See id.
35.

Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1,
2014), vacated, 799 F.3d 468.

36. See id.
37.

Varsity, 799 F.3d at 476.
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This case presented a question of first impression for the Sixth Circuit: What
approach should be taken to determine whether a design’s PGS features are distinct
and separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article on which they appear?38
Before establishing its own test to determine the copyrightability of PGS works, the
court started with a two-part test culled from the language of the Act: (1) whether
the design is for a useful article; and (2) if so, whether the PGS features can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
function of the article.39 “This second question is often referred to as testing the
‘separability’ of the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features of the design of a useful
article.”40 The court began its analysis by describing the nine distinct approaches to
conceptual separability utilized by other circuits and scholars.41
The Sixth Circuit then established its own five-pronged test to determine
whether a PGS design is copyrightable: (1) whether the design is a PGS work; (2) if
it is a PGS work, whether it is a design of a useful article; (3) what are the utilitarian
aspects of the useful article; (4) whether PGS features of the design can be identified
38. Id. at 481.
39.

Id.

40. Id.
41.

Id. at 484 –85. The court discussed the approaches in the following order: (1) the Copyright Office’s
approach, which provides for conceptual separability “only if the artistic feature and the useful article
could both exist side by side and be perceived [separately],” id. at 484 (quoting U.S. Copyright Office,
supra note 8, § 924.2(B)); (2) the primary-subsidiary approach, which states that conceptual separability
exists “if the artistic features of the design are ‘primary’ to the ‘subsidiary utilitarian function,’” id.
(quoting Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)); (3) the
objectively necessary approach, which provides that “if the artistic features of the design are not necessary
to the performance of the utilitarian function of the article,” then the article is conceptually separable, id.;
(4) the ordinary-observer approach, which defines conceptual separability as “creat[ing] in the mind of
the ordinary[, reasonable] observer two different concepts that are not inevitably entertained
simultaneously,” id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp.,
773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting)); (5) the design-process approach, which
provides for conceptual separability if the design elements ref lect the “designer’s artistic judgment
exercised independently of functional influences,” id. (quoting Brandir Int’l, Inc., v. Cascade Pac. Lumber
Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987)); (6) the stand-alone approach, which provides for conceptual
separability if “the useful article’s functionality remain[s] intact once the copyrightable material is
separated,” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d
913, 934 (7th Cir. 2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting)); (7) the likelihood-of-marketability approach, which
states that conceptual separability exists when, “even if the article ha[s] no utilitarian use it would still be
marketable to some significant segment of the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities,” id.
(quoting Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005)); (8) Patry’s approach,
which asks whether designs are “separable from the ‘utilitarian aspects’ of the article,” rather than the
article itself, satisfying separability if the discernable PGS features are “capable of existing as intangible
features independent of the utilitarian aspects of the useful article,” and are not “dictated by the form or
function of the utilitarian aspects of the useful article,” id. at 485 (quoting 2 William F. Patry, Patry
on Copyright § 3:146 (2015)); and (9) the subjective-objective approach, which determines separability
by balancing the extent “to which the designer’s subjective process is motivated by aesthetic concerns [and
the extent] to which the design . . . is objectively dictated by [the article’s] utilitarian function,” id.
(quoting Barton R. Keyes, Note, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate Surrounding Conceptual
Separablility in American Copyright Law, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 109, 141 (2008)).
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separately from the utilitarian aspects of the useful article; and (5) whether the useful
article’s PGS features can exist independently of its utilitarian aspects.42
To answer the last prong of this test, separability, the court utilized both the
Copyright Office’s approach and the objectively necessary approach.43 It also partially
endorsed the design-process approach because the designer’s testimony offered insight as
to which elements of the designs were essential to the utilitarian function of the article.44
By drawing from these tests, the Sixth Circuit followed the general approach of
the Second and Fourth Circuits, incorporating multiple separability doctrines into
one analysis.45 The court emphasized the need for such an approach owing to the
complexity of copyright cases, and commented on the difficulty of employing a single
separability doctrine for design copyrights.46 However, instead of adopting one of the
Second’s or Fourth Circuit’s hybrids, the Sixth Circuit created a new one of its own.47
Applying its five-pronged test to Varsity’s designs, the Sixth Circuit concluded
first that Varsity’s designs were two-dimensional works of graphic art.48 Second, the
court affirmed that cheerleading uniforms do indeed have an intrinsic utilitarian
function; they are not produced merely to “portray the appearance of [clothing] or to
convey information.”49
In answer to the third prong, the court rejected Star’s contention that the utilitarian
aspect of a cheerleading uniform is to identify oneself as a cheerleader.50 The court
determined that, while also serving a decorative function, the utilitarian aspects of a
cheerleading uniform are to cover the body, wick away moisture, and withstand
athletic movements.51 It reasoned that a useful article’s decorative function alone does
not render it incapable of conceptual separability.52
42.

Id. at 487–88 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2012)).

43.

Id. at 488–89.

44. Id. at 488.
45.

See id. at 485–87; Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417 (4th Cir.
2010) (applying the objectively necessary and design-process approaches to conceptual separability);
Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying the objectively
necessary, design-process, and ordinary-observer approaches to conceptual separability).

46. “These cases from the Second and Fourth Circuits illustrate that it is difficult to select one approach to

the question whether an artistic design is conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the
article. We adopt a similar hybrid approach now.” Varsity, 799 F.3d at 487.

47.

Id. at 488–89.

48. Id. at 489 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 for the proposition that PGS works include two and three-dimensional

works of art).

49. Id. at 489–90 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
50. “But this is no different than saying that a utilitarian aspect of a cheerleading uniform is to convey to

others the fact that the wearer . . . is a cheerleader . . . .” Id. at 490 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful
article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to . . . convey information.”)).

51.

Id.

52.

The court stated: “We therefore conclude that a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work’s ‘decorative function’
does not render it unable to ‘be identified separately from,’ or ‘[in]capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article.’” Id. at 490–91 (alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
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In response to the fourth prong, the Sixth Circuit held that the graphic design
elements could be identified separately from the utilitarian aspects of the uniform
because they did not enhance the uniform’s functionality. 53 Since different
cheerleading uniforms contained different designs, the court reasoned that the
functionality of the uniform does not depend on the specific design imposed on the
clothing.54 To emphasize this point, the court explained that the interchangeability
of these designs illustrates that the designs and the uniform could be found side by
side, as separate and distinct concepts.55
Finally, the court analyzed whether Varsity’s designs could exist independently of
the utilitarian aspects of the uniforms, thereby testing the conceptual separability of
the uniforms’ designs.56 The Sixth Circuit explained that all of Varsity’s designs
could be imposed on different garments, including cheerleading uniforms, t-shirts,
warm-ups, and jackets.57 Since the designs did not interfere with the way the uniform
functioned, they were conceptually separable.58 The Sixth Circuit concluded that
since Varsity’s designs were conceptually separable from the uniforms and not
necessary to their utilitarian function, Varsity’s two-dimensional designs were
copyrightable.59 Therefore, it vacated the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to Star and remanded the case for further proceedings.60
As courts and scholars across the nation have noted, this area of copyright law is
difficult to resolve.61 This case comment contends that although the court ultimately
reached the proper conclusion, the Sixth Circuit erred in its approach to conceptual
separability. First, the court erroneously adopted a broad hybrid test for conceptual
separability in the fifth prong of its test for the copyrightability of PGS works.
Instead, the court should have only used the more objective primary-subsidiary test
for conceptual separability because it would have reached the same result more
efficiently and avoided issues of aesthetic discrimination.62 By implementing its hybrid
approach, the Sixth Circuit created weak precedent that will yield unpredictable
results and continued confusion in conceptual separability.
53.

Id. at 491.

54. Id.
55.

Id.

56. Id.
57.

Id.

58. Id. at 492 (“We therefore conclude the arrangement of stripes, chevrons, color blocks, and zigzags are

‘wholly unnecessary to the performance of ’ the garment’s ability to cover the body, permit free movement,
and wick moisture.” (quoting Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985)).

59.

Id.

60. Id. at 493.
61.

See id. at 484 (citing Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological
Age 490 (6th ed. 2012)); Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 669–70 (3d
Cir. 1990).

62. See infra note 92.
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First, the Sixth Circuit erred when it adopted a hybrid approach to determine
conceptual separability in PGS works because nine other conceptual separability tests
already existed.63 By adopting an approach that combined multiple legal standards, the
court not only contributed to the complexity in copyright law, but also added unnecessary
subjective components to the conceptual separability analysis. In fact, several U.S.
Supreme Court dissenting and concurring opinions in numerous areas of the law have
criticized the application of hybrid tests because they are often vague and confusing.64
For example, in Fedorenko v. United States, the Supreme Court diverted from an
established legal standard and instead relied on the plain language of the statutory
exception to reach its decision.65 Justice Harry Blackmun, concurring in the judgment,
expressed his regret over the Court’s refusal to employ the Chaunt test,66 which was
already well-settled.67 He stated:
63. Supra note 41.
64. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 812 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s

holding because “the Court’s hybrid approach establishes no clear criteria and hence will generate
needless satellite litigation”); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 126 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, J.) (“Rather than applying straightforward equal protection analysis, the Court
substitutes for the holding in Swain a curious hybrid. The defendant must first establish a ‘prima facie
case’ of invidious discrimination, then the ‘burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral
explanation for challenging black jurors.’” (citations omitted)); Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460
U.S. 370, 417–18 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in No. 81-485 and dissenting in No.
81-930, joined by Marshall, J.) (“[A] general inconsistent events theory would surely give more guidance
than the vague hybrid established by the Court today. The dimensions of the Court’s newly fashioned
‘fundamentally inconsistent event’ version of the tax benefit rule are by no means clear.”); infra notes
65–72 and accompanying text.

65.

449 U.S. 490 (1981). The issue in this case was whether the petitioner’s citizenship could be revoked
under the Displaced Persons Act (DPA) of 1948. Id. at 493–95. The DPA allowed European refugees
who were driven from their homelands to enter the United States, but it excluded those who had acted
in concert with or in aid of enemy forces. Id. at 495. The petitioner was an armed prison guard at the
Nazi concentration camp in Treblinka, Poland. Id. at 494. He immigrated to the United States under
the DPA and obtained his citizenship in 1970. Id. at 496–97. In 1977, the government moved to
denaturalize the petitioner and charged him with willfully concealing his wartime involvement, thereby
procuring his visa and citizenship illegally or by willfully misrepresenting material facts. Id. at 497–98.
For concealment of material evidence, the DPA provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys . . . to institute proceedings . . . for the
purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship
and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and
certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a
material fact or by willful misrepresentation . . . .

8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012) (emphasis added). The exception to the DPA provided that those who had
persecuted civilians in aid of the enemy were disqualified from being eligible for visas. Fedorenko, 449
U.S. at 510.
66. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 354–55 (1960). This test defined “material facts” in relation to

the DPA and the revocation of a person’s citizenship. Id. The burden of proof fell on the government to
show by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence either that the facts were suppressed and, if known,
would have warranted denial of citizenship, or that their disclosure might have led to other facts that
warranted denial of citizenship. Id. at 355.

67.

See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 519.
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In Chaunt, the Court articulated two approaches to provide guidance and
uniformity in such inquiries. The Court today adopts what it considers a new
and minimal definition of materiality . . . . I would rely explicitly upon the
Chaunt test here and avoid risking the confusion that is likely to be engendered
by multiple standards.68

Similarly, in Varsity, the Sixth Circuit passed over nine conceptual separability tests
that were previously utilized by other circuits and created a new test.69 The Sixth
Circuit had numerous approaches at its disposal, yet it added to the confusion in
copyright law by creating its own hybrid test. Importantly, the Sixth Circuit failed to
explain why a hybrid test was more practical and efficient than any of the preexisting
tests. Much like the majority’s approach in Fedorenko, the court simply dismissed the
opportunity to adopt and apply a preexisting test.70
In another criticism of the Court’s decision to depart from known standards and
employ a new hybrid test, Chief Justice William Rehnquist in Schlup v. Delo
denounced the majority’s analysis and conclusion, stating that the Court had engaged
in a “classic mixing of apples and oranges” when it required a showing that combined
two prongs from different tests.71 He continued: “The hybrid which the Court serves
up is bound to be a source of confusion. . . . [T]he sensible course would be to modify
that familiar standard rather than to create a confusing hybrid.” 72 Instead the Court
created a different legal test, a hybrid containing components of prior standards,
which was unnecessary because established standards already existed.
68. Id. at 520–21.
69. Although the other circuits’ approaches to conceptual separability are not binding on the Sixth Circuit,

the Varsity court could have adopted a specific hybrid approach from another circuit to create uniformity
in copyright law and avoid further confusion and unpredictability. Nonetheless, even if the Sixth Circuit
adopted another circuit’s hybrid, this comment argues that it still would have been an erroneous
approach because nine other discrete tests were available.

70. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 487 (6th Cir. 2015).
71.

513 U.S. 298, 339 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). After being charged with and convicted of
murdering a fellow inmate, the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that a constitutional
error deprived the jury of crucial evidence that would have established his innocence. Id. at 301–02
(majority opinion). In reviewing the habeas petition, the majority analyzed the Carrier and Sawyer
standards. Id. at 318–27. The Carrier standard requires a habeas petitioner to show that the constitutional
violation has “probably” resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent. Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). The Sawyer standard requires a petitioner to prove “by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the
petitioner eligible for the death penalty.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992). The majority
concluded that the Carrier standard applied but added that the showing of innocence also requires proof
that more likely than not no reasonable juror would have convicted the defendant on the basis of the
new evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326, 327, 329. Judge Rehnquist stated:
“More likely than not” is a quintessential charge to a finder of fact, while “no reasonable
juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence” is an equally
quintessential conclusion of law similar to the standard that courts constantly employ in
deciding motions for judgment of acquittal in criminal cases.

Id. at 339 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

72. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 339–40 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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The Sixth Circuit mimicked the majority’s approach in Schlup when it took
accepted approaches, whether in whole or in part, and combined them to formulate a
new standard for conceptual separability. Considering the extent of ambiguity in this
area of law,73 it is perplexing that the Sixth Circuit did not adopt an existing test, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist recommended in Schlup. Rather, the Sixth Circuit added to
the confusion surrounding conceptual separability by adopting a hybrid strategy,
about which Supreme Court Justices have given ample warning and have implied that
the more practical, clear, and efficient approach would be to apply existing standards.
Furthermore, a single, narrowly tailored test furthers the purpose of the Act,
benefitting authors of original works, by contemplating the specific characteristics of
a particular category of art. “[L]imitation[s] on the scope of copyright law ha[ve]
been used to accomplish an expansion of the subject matter of copyright.” 74 Under
this theory, if one test applies to garment designs75 and another test applies to
mannequin faces,76 both garment designs and mannequin faces have a distinct
conceptual separability test, which affords each broader protection under the Act.77
This would allow courts to rely on unambiguous tests for each artistic category,
which would afford broader protection to works as a whole.78 Had the Sixth Circuit
done this, it would have furthered the Act’s purpose, by “promot[ing] the nation’s
culture and learning.”79 Unambiguous and definitive tests in copyright law encourage
creativity and authorship because they protect original works against infringement.
Additionally, there are many practical benefits to using one test for conceptual
separability. Judge Jerry E. Smith in Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co. stated:
Sometimes, we must favor what might be a sub-optimal prophylactic rule
because it is more determinate than the theoretically superior but hopelessly
subjective one. . . . [W]e do conclude that . . . it is not so theoretically infirm

73. “How to conduct the conceptual separation is, in turn, what continues to f lummox federal courts.”

Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005).

74.

Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 321, 346 (1989).

75. See Galiano, 416 F.3d at 421.
76. Id. (“Surely the Seventh Circuit considered itself as setting forth a test for courts to use when

encountering any applied art but . . . courts have not rushed to extend the rule beyond mannequin
designs.”); see Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004).

77.

Conversely, if there is one broad test that applies to both categories of subject matter, the conceptual
separability analysis is not precise in its application.

78. Each individual category of art in PGS works would have its own unambiguous test to determine

conceptual separability. While definitive tests may result in less protection for a particular kind of PGS
work, PGS works as a whole would be entitled to broader protection because there would be fewer gray
areas when determining separability and therefore copyrightability.

79. John B. Fowles, The Utility of a Bright-Line Rule in Copyright Law: Freeing Judges from Aesthetic

Controversy and Conceptual Separability in Leicester v. Warner Bros., 12 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 301, 305
(2005) (citation omitted); see also L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of
Copyright: A Law of Users’ Rights 2 (1991) (discussing the primary purpose of the Act, which is to
promote public welfare by encouraging the public to produce and distribute new works).
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that such inferiority overcomes the benefits . . . of having a more determinate
rule.80

A determinate test is fundamental to affording copyright protection to PGS works
because it reduces the inherent subjectivity of conceptual separability.81 Had the
Sixth Circuit applied a single test instead of a hybrid to determine only the conceptual
separability of fabric designs, it would have avoided the task of attempting to apply
this complex test to all PGS works in future cases.
Second, the Sixth Circuit should have used the primary-subsidiary test82 as its
single conceptual separability test for fabric designs. Under the primary-subsidiary
test, conceptual separability exists if the design’s artistic features are primary to the
article’s subsidiary utilitarian function.83 In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl,
Inc., the Second Circuit held that the primary ornamental aspect of the belt buckles
at issue was conceptually separable from the belt buckles’ subsidiary utilitarian
function.84 Although the court did not expressly state what that function was, Judge
Jack Weinstein’s dissenting opinion stated what the majority implied: that the
utilitarian function of belt buckles was “to keep the tops of trousers at waist level.”85
Therefore, the ornamental aspect of the belt buckles was primary to the subsidiary
utilitarian function of holding pants around a person’s waist.
Viewing the primary-subsidiary test in this light shows why it is applicable to
fabric designs and thus applicable to the Varsity case. The Sixth Circuit recognized
that the fabric designs served a decorative purpose, 86 which is analogous to the
Second Circuit’s holding in Kieselstein-Cord that the belt buckles also served an
ornamental purpose.87 This illustrates the distinct relationship between the artistic
features of the fabric designs and the uniforms’ utilitarian function. Since the
primary-subsidiary test hinges on the distinct, separate relationship between artistic
features and utilitarian function,88 the court should have adopted this test, clarified
its definition,89 and limited its application to fabric designs.
80. Galiano, 416 F.3d at 421.
81.

See infra pp. 251–52.

82. Supra note 41.
83. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980).
84. Id. at 993. The plaintiff designed and manufactured belt buckles with distinct sculptural elements. Id.

at 990. The plaintiff ’s customers sometimes wore the belt buckles around the neck or elsewhere on the
body as jewelry. Id. at 991. The plaintiff commenced a lawsuit after realizing that the defendant’s belt
buckle designs were substantially similar to the plaintiff ’s belt buckles. See id.

85. Id. at 994 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). Judge Weinstein, a district court judge for the Eastern District of

New York, heard the case by designation.

86. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 490 (6th Cir. 2015).
87.

Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.

88. See generally id. (implying a relationship existed between the ornamental aspects of the belt buckles and

their utilitarian function of holding pants at waist level).

89. The primary-subsidiary test is often criticized for its unspecific guidance in determining what is

primary and what is subsidiary. See Fowles, supra note 79, at 313–14; Keyes, supra note 41, at 123–24;
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Conceptual separability is inherently subjective because it tests the balance
between artistic features and utilitarian functions.90 As a result, the court must
naturally make some judgment on artistic features of a work to determine whether or
not they are separable from functional features. Despite the subjectivity in separability
analyses, the primary-subsidiary test has objective components, as it concentrates on
the relationship between artistic features and utilitarian functions and not the artistic
features themselves.91 Therefore, with respect to fabric designs, this test is functionally
superior to other conceptual separability tests because the court need only focus on
an objective determination: the relationship between artistic features and the
utilitarian function of the article into which the fabric designs are incorporated.
Moreover, the primary-subsidiary test avoids issues of aesthetic discrimination.92 In
essence, the principle instructs courts to avoid basing copyrightability determinations
on what a judge or fact finder believes is worthy of protection.93 Copyrightability tests
should not test the weight of how artistic or aesthetically pleasing the work is to the
court but should instead test originality and fixation objectively.94 The primarysubsidiary test removes the judge’s subjective determinations of a work’s value made on
the basis of her personal aesthetic preferences, and instead relies objectively on whether
aesthetics serve a purpose primary to the subsidiary utilitarian function of a work.95
Sonja Wolf Sahlsten, Note, I’m a Little Treepot: Conceptual Separability and Affording Copyright Protection
to Useful Articles, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 941, 957 (2015).
90. See Walker & Depoorter, supra note 18, at 351–53, 363 –67.
91.

See Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993–94 (considering that the “buckles’ wearers . . . have used them as
ornamentation for parts of the body other than the waist” and concluding that the sculptural elements
of the belt buckles were primary to their subsidiary utilitarian function).

92.

The aesthetic nondiscrimination principle originated from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s famous
passage in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to
miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted,
for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be
denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value,— it would be bold
to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value,—and the taste of any
public is not to be treated with contempt.

188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903); see also Chisum et al., supra note 16, § 4C[1][d] (explaining
how courts generally apply this standard).
93.

See supra note 92.

94. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. 239. “To be copyrightable subject matter, a work of authorship must be fixed in a

tangible medium of expression ‘from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.’” Chisum et al., supra note 16, § 4C[2] (alteration
in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)).

95. See discussion supra pp. 250–51.
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This test removes the need for aesthetic evaluation in both copyright law and conceptual
separability, which “promote[s] objectivity and eliminate[s] questions of taste.”96
In deciding which separability tests to implement in the Sixth Circuit, the Varsity
court alluded to the issue of aesthetic discrimination and stated that it chose not to
implement the likelihood-of-marketability test97 because of its subjective nature.98 By
explicitly rejecting the subjective nature of this test, the court seemingly recognized
that objective tests are fundamental to determining conceptual separability and
ultimately, copyrightability. Considering this acknowledgement, it is troublesome
that the court did not implement the objective primary-subsidiary approach as its
sole conceptual separability test. If it had done so, it would have been one step closer
to simplifying this area of copyright law 99 and creating clear precedent.
Through its implementation and application of a hybrid approach for PGS works,
the Varsity court made an unforced blunder that effectively prevented it from setting
a cogent standard for conceptual separability in the Sixth Circuit. The court stated
that “it is difficult to select one approach to the question whether an artistic design is
conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article.”100 However, this
difficulty is primarily evident when courts, like the Sixth Circuit, attempt to
categorize all artistic designs into one group and apply a hybrid test. Such tests
provide little guidance because it is unclear in any individual legal analysis whether
all tests within the hybrid have equal influence.101 Courts must now grapple with the
issue of how much weight to assign each element or test of the hybrid in any given
case. Consequently, this tug-of-war approach adds to the subjectivity in the
conceptual separability analysis because there are multiple factors that influence the
application of any particular test to a case’s facts.
Even more problematic for precedent is when hybrid tests are applied inconsistently
within the same circuit.102 Legal standards exist to establish precedent and ensure
96. Walker & Depoorter, supra note 18, at 353.
97.

Supra note 41.

98. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 489 & n.11 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Bleistein,

188 U.S. at 251–52).

99. See id. at 496–97 (McKeague, J., dissenting).

It is apparent that either Congress or the Supreme Court (or both) must clarify
copyright law with respect to garment design. The law in this area is a mess—and it has
been for a long time. The majority takes a stab at sorting it out, and so do I. But until
we get much-needed clarification, courts will continue to struggle and the business
world will continue to be handicapped by the uncertainty of the law.

Id. (citation omitted).

100. Id. at 487 (majority opinion).
101. See supra note 12.
102. The Second Circuit has made this error in conceptual separability analyses. See Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v.

Fiesta Fashions, 500 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir. 2012) (employing a hybrid approach consisting of elements of
the ordinary observer approach, the design-process approach, and the primary-subsidiary test); Chosun
Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2005) (employing a hybrid approach to
conceptual separability consisting of elements of the objectively necessary approach, the design-process
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predictability in the American justice system.103 Hybrid tests do not further this
purpose when used inconsistently within the same jurisdiction. Although there is
potential for courts to reach the same outcome applying different tests, the resulting
uncertainty runs contrary to the aim of establishing consistent judicial precedent and
makes it difficult for an artist to remain confident that her work will be protected.
A single test for conceptual separability would alleviate conf lict and tension
within the judicial system because it would make clear what test would apply to a
given case, which would provide firm precedent and predictable outcomes.
In light of the above policy considerations, it is unclear why the Sixth Circuit
failed to endorse the primary-subsidiary test as its sole conceptual separability
standard. It furthers the purpose of the Act because it provides greater protection to
fabric designers.104 As many consumers purchase clothing with the purpose of
appearing a certain way to others,105 the primary purpose of purchasing garments is
more likely expressive than purely functional, and therefore fabric designs on
garments would frequently be protected from infringement under the primarysubsidiary test.106 This limited approach thus affords broader protection107 to clothing
designers and encourages them to be creative.
While the Sixth Circuit ultimately reached the proper conclusion, it erred when
it created and applied a hybrid test to the conceptual separability analysis. Not only
does this approach generate confusing precedent, but it is also contrary to the purpose
of the Act. Had the Sixth Circuit endorsed the primary-subsidiary test alone and
limited the scope of its application to fabric designs, the court would have reached
the same result more efficiently while creating vibrant, bright-line precedent. Instead,
the future of conceptual separability and the copyrightability of fabric designs
remains in purgatory.

approach, and the ordinary observer approach); see also Walker & Depoorter, supra note 18, at 365–67
(discussing the various conceptual separability tests inconsistently employed by the Second Circuit).
103. See Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 308, 333 (2009).

Id.

A fundamental tenet of the American legal system is that like cases should be treated
alike. . . . [U]niformity promotes predictability . . . . [C]onsistency in the resolution of
cases promotes respect for the judiciary by strengthening the perception that judicial
decisions are not influenced by political or other extralegal considerations.

104. See supra pp. 250–52.
105. “Aesthetics of dress is about how people choose to appear, and the way they want to look to themselves

and others within a particular context.” Marilyn DeLong, Aesthetics of Dress, Berg Fashion Library,
https://www.bloomsburyfashioncentral.com/products/berg-fashion-library/article/bibliographicalguides/aesthetics-of-dress (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).

106. See supra pp. 250–52.
107. Samuels, supra note 74, at 346.
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